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The Procreative Argument for Proscribing
Same-Sex Marriage,
by DOUGLAS W. KMIEC"
Why Traditional Marriage Matters To A Free Society
Traditional marriage between a man and a woman matters. In its
ideal form, traditional or heterosexual marriage transforms by
covenant, the emotional and sexual attraction of two individuals into
a lasting relationship capable of sharing intimate personal goods as
well as serving larger social purposes. The first civilization of the
family necessarily rests upon the marital faithfulness of the couple
and the creation of a complementary unity that is distinct from either
individual. When the marital union is strong it is also stable, and in
this atmosphere of stability children are welcomed and reared to be
responsible, healthy and well-educated citizens.
Sustaining both the love that gives rise to the formation of a
traditional family as well as the particularized education and care of
the children born of the marital union of a man and woman,
traditional marriage stands at the boundary of private and public life.
Within the private sphere of married life, there is little imposition of
duty by public authority. Sentiment and kinship, rather than
constitution or law, govern. At home, the marital union or the family
live by its own ideas of liberty, equality and due process and these -
absent evidence of abuse - are generally free from governmental
intrusion or second-guessing.
Lawrence v. Texas2 somewhat controversially extends this
1. The author gratefully acknowledges Hastings College of the Law for the
opportunity to present this paper in the February 2005 symposium, as well as the Center
for Constructive Alternatives at Hillsdale College which extended him the opportunity to
orally present an earlier draft of these thoughts in September 2004.
Caruso Family Chair & Professor of Constitutional Law, Pepperdine University;
former Head of the Office of Legal Counsel to Presidents Ronald Reagan and George
H.W. Bush and former dean, The Catholic University of America School of Law.
[6531
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
freedom beyond the traditional family to protect a given form of
sexual expression. This is controversial since Lawrence thereby
severs the mutuality of freedom and obligation that had always
existed between family and public sovereign in lieu of a more
unilateral privacy claim dependent thinly upon a demand of
individual autonomy and a prudential recognition of the limits of the
law.
In the past, the intra-marital union or intra-family, freedom of a
traditional family was acknowledged in exchange for the faithful
performance by the family of social expectations or obligations
toward the education and care of family members. The public
sovereign respected the private marital union so long as it yielded
new individuals with sufficient qualities to maintain the on-going
functions of the community as a whole. In short, the public sovereign
anticipated that those raised intra-family had received such direction
that, upon emancipation and emergence into the public community as
free and independent citizens, they would live productive lives and
respect the equal dignity of human beings notwithstanding the far
greater anonymity of the larger society. By comparison, the Court
makes the public sovereign (that is, "we the people") stay its hand in
Lawrence with respect to a non-traditional sexual practice without
any articulated social expectations for that relationship and simply
because it would be practically impossible or unseemly to do
otherwise.
Marriage And Procreation Are Necessarily Linked
Despite the differences between the marital freedom of a
traditional family and mere autonomy claims glossed over in
Lawrence, it can be reasonably speculated that same-sex individuals
desire intimacy or a private sphere of decision making as much as
heterosexual couples within a traditional marriage. Indeed, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made this desire the linchpin
for its conclusion that Massachusetts' constitution precludes limiting
marriage to a man and a woman. Proclaiming to break the linkage
between marriage and procreation, the Goodridge court called this
yearning for intimacy the "sine qua non" of the marital relationship.
Of course, apart from sexual intimacy there is evidence of a modest
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
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level of interest by same-sex couples in child-rearing, though as
discussed below, there are serious and sensitive disputes about the
comparative level of that interest and its efficacy Such doubts about
the differences between same-sex and traditional child-rearing
require further study, and any discussion of the existing or future
empirical literature must always be conducted equally free of gender
stereotype or homophobic animus or polemical allegations of the
6
same.
4. William L. Pierce, Adopting Numbers, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-pierce082703.asp. (Aug. 27,2003).
5. Paul Cameron & Kirk Cameron, Did the APA Misrepresent the Scientific
Literature to Courts in Support of Homosexual Custody?, 131 J. OF PSYCHOL. 313 (1997).
See also, Timothy J. Dailey, Homosexual Parenting: Placing Children at Risk, at
http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles/DaileyGayAdopt.htm
6. It should be observed that the recognition of gender equality in the marketplace,
however, would not seem to alter the essence of the procreative case for traditional
marriage. Whether women divide their time between home and market or give greater
emphasis to one over the other, only men and women together can yield new life by
sexually reproductive means. This is important to state clearly since there is no basis in
the modern constitutional doctrines of gender equality to assume that the legal prohibition
of gender stereotype has somehow led to the physical or scientific identity of the genders.
Abundant research, much of it well catalogued and analyzed by Steven E. Rhoads in
Taking Sex Differences Seriously, demonstrates that gender differences persist regardless
of market or non-market pursuits. STEVEN E. RHOADS, TAKING SEX DIFFERENCES
SERIOUSLY (2004). Rhoads observes, for example, that "women and mothers are more
attached to young children than men and fathers are," and this is reciprocated by the
children. At the same time, Rhoads' work and the research of many on fatherless families
"almost universally shows [the father's absence] to be deleterious in a host of important
areas":
Though father-absence hurts both girls and boys, the latter are particularly at
risk. Boys raised in families without a biological father are more likely to exhibit
delinquent and criminal behavior. Boys raised in single-parent families are twice
as likely to have committed a crime, and boys raised in stepfamilies are three
times as likely to have done so.
Id. at 83.
Does the literature on single-parent households and fatherless households carry over
to the same-sex context? There are claims both ways. Sociologist David Popenoe has
written that "I know of few other bodies of data in which the weight of evidence is so
decisively on one side of the issue: On the whole, for children, two-parent families are
preferable." David Popenoe, The Controversial Truth: Two Parent Families Are Better,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1992, at A21. Yet, as gay marriage advocate Evan Wolfson has
pointed out, this finding may well reflect simply the greater resources, on average, of
families with two parents, rather than one. EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE
MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY AND GAY PEOPLE'S RIGHTS TO MARRY (2004).
Wolfson is on shakier ground when he claims that there is no proof that gay parents turn
out gay children. Id: Wolfson himself concedes that "science still hasn't fully determined
how our sexual orientation ... is formed ...." Id. at 98. Responsible voices have raised
cautionary concerns. Recently, a federal appellate court, for example, sustained Florida's
prohibition of same-sex adoption, noting the rational state interest in "emphasizing [the]
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That said, neither the common desire for intimacy nor even an
assumed comparability of child-rearing capability between same-sex
and traditional couples addresses the heart of the state interest for
maintaining marriage as an institution between a man and a woman.
In brief, that interest is both the encouragement of procreation and its
responsible treatment by heterosexual couples. Before elaborating on
the nature and constitutional acceptability of this interest, a number
of red-herrings need to be set aside almost immediately.
First, the acceptance of the procreative state interest does not
depend upon excluding from marriage those who cannot physically
procreate because of age or infertility. This is unfortunately a
frequent and unpersuasive argument made by homosexual marriage
advocates when the importance of maintaining the relationship
between procreation and marriage is stated Understanding and
admitting the promotion and responsible exercise of procreation to
be a vital or compelling state interest, logically separates same-sex
couples from other nonprocreative classes. The elderly or infertile
cannot be separated without a constitutionally impermissible,
individualized inquiry. It would be highly intrusive of privacy for the
state to inquire of heterosexual couples to determine if they are
disinclined toward procreation or infertile, and settled constitutional
jurisprudence provides that government may not intrude "into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
vital role that dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender identity." Lofton
v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004). In
this regard, the state prefers those within a traditional marriage, or even an unmarried
heterosexual, in the adoption context recognizing that "[i]n our society, we expect that
parents will provide [sex] education to teenagers in the home. These subjects are often
very embarrassing for teenagers and some aspects of the education are accomplished by
the parents telling stories about their own adolescence and explaining their own
experiences with the opposite sex." Id. at 822.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been a thoughtful advocate for gender equality
throughout her career, yet, she has written for the Court that the genders are simply not
identical. "Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring: '[T]he
two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from
a community composed of both."' United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)
(quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)). "'Inherent differences'
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but
not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual's opportunity." Id. In this, Justice Ginsburg fairly rejects the same-sex claim
that "the modem individuation of women has resulted in the kind of fluidity of gender
roles for men and women" that makes the presence of both genders within a family
unnecessary. Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy,
Polygamy, and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1606 (1997).
7. See WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 80 (2004).
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to bear or beget a child."8
Frankly, such individualized inquiry is unnecessary for the social
good -or as the Supreme Court put it, "the existence and survival of
the race."9 It is unnecessary, that is, so long as the vast majority of
those who do marry in a society are capable and inclined toward
having children and then to rearing them responsibly. While the state
can tolerate a modest level of disinterest or inability to procreate, it is
far more questionable whether any state can rationally be indifferent
to sustaining its population by giving public marital sanction to
individuals who, because of physical reality and the nature of their
sexual relationship, cannot procreate.
In response, same sex marriage advocates typically highlight
adoptions by some same sex couples or asexual means of
reproduction. Neither response is sufficient nor unproblematic.
Given the costly and cumbersome nature of adoption and asexual
reproduction," it is not surprising to find some debate in the academic
literature over exactly how welcoming or inclined homosexual
partners are toward including children by these means. For instance,
a recent report suggests that gay claims of interest in adoption are
overstated. Of the 1.6 million children under 18 in adopted
households only 1.8 percent were in gay or lesbian households, or
about, 29,000 children in each setting." Even if the possibility of gay
and lesbian adoption is conceded, adoption - how ever well-
motivated and praiseworthy in terms of providing for a neglected
child - does not yield new children, it merely re-allocates existing
ones. By comparison to the 58,000 or so adopted children in gay
settings, there are close to 60 million biological children under 18
8. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
9. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
10. The Indiana Court of Appeals in rejecting state constitutional claims to same-sex
marriage in Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 n.10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) noted that:
The average cost of one IVF cycle in the United States, and it frequently takes
multiple cycles in order to succeed, has been estimated at $12,400, which usually
is not covered by health insurance. See American Society of Reproductive
Medicine, "Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility,"
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.htm (last visited January 11, 2005). Current
estimates of adoption costs range from zero, in some instances, to as much as
$40,000 or more. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Administration for Children and Families, "Costs of Adopting: A Factsheet for
Families," http://naic.acf hhs.gov/pubs/scost/s_costs.pdf (published June 2004).
11. William L. Pierce, Adopting Numbers, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-pierce082703.asp. (Aug. 27,2003).
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according to the 2000 Census.
The potential procreative harm of recognizing same-sex
marriage is also magnified because the rate of world population
growth has declined by more than 40% since the late 1960s. 3 "[T]he
average woman in the world bears half as many children as did her
counterpart in 1972. No industrialized country [the United States
included] still produces enough children to sustain its population over
time. ...,,14 The primary present cause of under-population is said to
be the cost-benefit conclusion that "children offer little or no
economic reward to their parents, and as women acquire economic
opportunities and reproductive control, the social and financial costs
of childbearing continue to rise.'' 5  Redefining marriage in the
Goodridge manner to mean merely "a relationship of emotional and
financial interdependence between two people who make a public
commitment"' 6 thus aggravates a pre-existing, and in light of the
modern experience of packed freeways, little recognized problem.
Today, traditional parents make an investment of over $200,000
(exclusive of college) to bring up a child to age 18, and yet, they often
receive the same economic benefits as those who do not invest in
raising children. Adding an increased number of childless
homosexual partners to the mix makes matters worse.
Under-population has multiple effects beyond inequities in social
welfare systems, however. When fertility drops below national
replacement levels, the number of productive workers likewise falls.
So too, countries with a low ratio of workers to retirees experience
less entrepreneurship and innovation. Elderly and pension benefits
gradually consume an ever larger share of GDP, currently over 9%,
but estimated to be rising to 20% by 2040. And in these terror-ridden
times, it is not only the economy that nosedives with fewer workers,
but national defense. The collapse of the birth rate in the former
Soviet Union resulted in 5.2 million fewer Russians between the ages
of 15 and 24 in comparison to 25 years earlier. And while high
12. U.S. Census Bureau, CENSUS 2000 PHC-T-21, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: 2000, TABLE 1: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN OF THE
HOUSEHOLDER BY TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP AND SEX OF CHILD FOR THE UNITED
STATES: 2000, at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t21/tab0l.pdf (Aug. 22,
2003).
13. Phillip Longman, The Global Baby Bust, 83 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May 1, 2004, at
64.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 191.
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technology may replace some of the foot-soldiers, the money for such
is being diverted to pension benefits. "The Pentagon today spends 84
cents on pensions for every dollar it spends on basic pay. 1 7 Phillip
Longman in Foreign Affairs sums this evidence nicely:
Does this mean that the future belongs to those who believe
they are (or who are in fact) commanded by a higher power to
procreate? Based on current trends, the answer appears to be
yes. Once, demographers believed that some law of human
nature would prevent fertility rates from remaining below
replacement level within any healthy population for more than
brief periods. After all, don't we all carry the genes of our
Neolithic ancestors, who one way or another managed to
produce enough babies to sustain the race? Today, however, it
has become clear that no law of nature ensures that human
beings, living in free, developed societies, will create enough
children to reproduce themselves.18
Asexual reproduction will not fill the gap of under-population.
At a minimum, the literature on the risks associated with non-
biological parenting raises concerns about giving greater public
sanction to households where biological parenting would not be the
norm. 9 Even if it is theoretically possible for a lesbian couple to
share a jerry-rigged biological relationship with a child - where, for
example, one lesbian partner supplies the egg and the other acts as a
womb surrogate - no same-sex couple can mutually share a genetic
17. Longman, supra note 13.
18. Id. The United Nations has confirmed similar statistics with regard to the below-
replacement levels of developed countries, writing "because fertility levels for most of the
developed countries are expected to remain below replacement level during 2000-2050, the
populations of 33 countries are projected to be smaller by mid-century than today (e.g., 14 per
cent smaller in Japan; 22 per cent smaller in Italy, and between 30 and 50 per cent smaller in the
cases of Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine)." Press release
of February 26, 2003, BELOW-REPLACEMENT FERTILITY EXPECTED IN 75 PER
CENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY YEAR 2050 ACCORDING TO UN
POPULATION REPORT, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/pop850.doc.htm.
19. Rhoads writes: "[A]lthough stepfathers can raise family income considerably,
they do not help prevent childhood and adolescent problems. Large numbers of
stepfathers become disengaged from parenting and compete with the child for the
mother's time. Stepfathers praise and hug their children significantly less than biological
fathers do. They are less likely to have intense conversations with them. Even worse,
child abuse goes way up when stepfathers are present. Stepfathers commit most of this
abuse, but even biological mothers are more abusive when they remarry than when they
remain single. The rate of infanticide increases by 6,000 percent, and sexual abuse
increases by a multiple of eight in stepfamilies as compared with traditional families."
RHOADS, supra note 6, at 83 (citing studies).
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relationship with the same child. Lesbian advocates tell us they hope
for the day when speculations about "egg fusion" may allow "two
women [to] produce a daughter with two mothers and no father."'
But whatever reproductive techniques may emerge in the future, the
reality of the present is that asexual methods of reproduction are
costly, intrusive, unevenly successful, and fraught with their own
ethical dilemmas and medical risks. One study observes that "less
than 0.5% of infertile couples in the U.S. are helped by in-vitro
fertilization each year."2' It is not surprising, therefore, that such
means account for only a tiny fraction of births in the United States.
In truth, the advocates of same sex marriage cannot genuinely
mean that procreation has not been, in fact, linked with marriage.
Rather, what same-sex partisans actually mean is that they would
prefer procreation not to be associated with the marital estate. Self-
described lesbian author Maura I. Strassberg writes, for example:
"Marriage is essential to procreation only where extra-marital sex is
criminalized and procreation is dependent upon sex., 22  What an
extraordinary claim. It pretends to make that which is obviously good
- marital fidelity and natural childbirth - seem odd or dispensable.
Unlike this curious claim of Professor Strassberg, the average person
associates marriage with procreation. Sexual reproduction for the
human species is not merely one of several equally attractive ways to
bring forth a child, it is the assumed way. It is no coincidence that
those with religious beliefs that correspond most strongly with a
traditional understanding of marriage as linked to procreation do,
indeed, have the most children. Utah, with its large percentage of
Mormons, produces 90 children for every 1000 women of childbearing
age. "By comparison, Vermont ... the (first] state to embrace gay
20. Strassberg, supra note 6, at 1602 n.566.
21. Tim Drake, Couples Ask: What's Wrong With In-vitro Fertilization?, NAT'L
CATHOLIC REGISTER, Aug.14, 2004, available at
http:/lcatholiceducation.orglarticle/medical-ethicslmeOO64.html. The author notes that
"the cost of such techniques remains high and the success rates low." Id. One reason for
the poor success rates is that many clinics fail to diagnose the source of the infertility,
preferring instead to immediately pursue asexual means. There are longstanding and well-
articulated religious and moral objections to giving preference to the laboratory over
natural procreation, not the least of which involves the implications it has for the
uniqueness and equality of human life. Moreover, Drake quotes Father Tadeusz
Pacholczyk, the director of education of the National Catholic Bioethics Center in
Philadelphia, who states that there are studies that "have shown a sixfold elevated risk for
in-vitro fertilization children contracting an eye disease called retinal blastoma versus
normally conceived babies."
22. Strassberg, supra note 6, at 1557.
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civil unions [] produces only 49. ' 23
Observing that adoption or asexual reproduction cannot
substitute for natural procreation may be met with the objection that
allowing same-sex marital unions need not have an adverse effect on
the number of heterosexual couples who wish to marry and procreate.
Gay and lesbian advocacy thus denies any adverse effect of
recognizing same-sex marriage on the number of traditional or
heterosexual marriages. ' Perhaps, this cannot be so easily dismissed,
however, since it is not unreasonable to assume that the frequency of
a relationship newly given public approval will be greater. Along
these lines, Robert Bork has written: "[b]y equating heterosexuality
and homosexuality, by removing the last vestiges of moral stigma
from same-sex couplings, such marriages will lead to an increase in
the number of homosexuals., 25  Whether explained by public
affirmation or not, something is going on. According to the Census
Bureau, the number of same-sex couples in the United States
increased dramatically during the last decade, from just 150,000 in
1990 to nearly 600,000 in 2000.26
In addition, giving public sanction to a homosexual relationship
which is premised upon mere intimacy without regard to natural
procreation or associated social expectations is likely to bolster the
public acceptance of heterosexual cohabiting relations outside of
marriage which independently have exploded in number. This has
been exactly the experience in the Netherlands where the legal
sanctioning of same-sex unions has diluted the significance of
marriage and posed all the social and economic perils (for children)
and instability (for both partners and children) associated with casual
cohabitation.
23. Longman, supra note 13.
24. Strassberg, supra note 6, at 1614-16.
25. Robert H. Bork, The Necessary Amendment, First Things: A Monthly Journal of
Religion and Public Life 17 (August/September 2004).
26. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 12.
27. Stanford's Stanley Kurtz writing for National Review Online finds:
As we've seen, the upswing in the Dutch out-of-wedlock birthrate coincides with
the enactment of registered partnerships and gay marriage. A diligent search for
alternative explanations, such as access to contraception and women in the
workforce, yields nothing that correlates well with the rise of out-of-wedlock
birthrates in the Netherlands. Both opponents and supporters of gay marriage
linked the willingness to embrace same-sex marriage with increasing social and
legal acceptance of cohabitation rather than marriage for couples with children.
Although pinpointing cause and effect raises particular challenges when studying
the intricacies of human social life, there are now at least strong indications that
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The last point underscores that same-sex and heterosexual
couples are differently situated in by virtue of the inherent inability of
same-sex couples to naturally procreate. Even as the inability of
same sex couples to procreate is patent, the threats to social program
posed by the contemporary reality of under-population are more
subtle and are not well observed. Consider, as just one handy
example, the difficulty of problem recognition that the President of
the United States has encountered as he has attempted to highlight
the under-population-abetted potential bankruptcy of the social
security system. To address these and other health and welfare
collateral effects of under-population alone, the state would have a
reasoned basis to decline to affirm, recognize, or license a sexual
practice that separates all sexual fulfillment from procreative
possibility.
The alert reader will also discern a derivative state procreative
justification for limiting marriage licensing, not just on the basis of
procreative possibility (the universe of all heterosexual couples), but
a more limited subset of responsibly procreative heterosexual
couples. In other words, a state interest in discouraging the public
affirmation of sexual practices that occur in total disregard of the
possibility of procreation is a state interest that is strong enough to
discourage irresponsible heterosexual practice. Public licensing or
affirmation is thus limited so that it may be deployed as an instrument
to convey the seriousness of engaging in sexual practice that may
beget children - a point especially important to convey to a potential
father whose practical and physical connection to a child does not
approximate that of a potential mother. Here, too, homosexual and
heterosexual classes are not similarly situated. Same-sex individuals
wanting to incorporate children into a household, to compensate for
physical inability, must invest sizeable personal efforts and sums to
adopt or to engage in asexual fertilization attempts. There is no
corresponding difficulty among heterosexual individuals who are
fertile. A state has an important interest in reserving the marriage
license as a means of instilling an ethic of responsible procreation
among heterosexual couples. This is exactly the rationale employed
by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Morrison v. Sadler to sustain its
Defense of Marriage Act as well as that state's refusal to issue same-
sex marriage licenses. Wrote the court:
Dutch gay marriage has contributed significantly to the decline of Dutch
marriage. Stanley Kurtz, No Explanation at
http://www.nationalreview.com/kurtz/kurtz2004O6O3O9lO.asp. (June 3, 2004)
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The State... identified the protection of unintended children
resulting from heterosexual intercourse as one of the key
interests in opposite-sex marriage. The institution of opposite-
sex marriage both encourages such couples to enter into a
stable relationship before having children and to remain in such
a relationship if children arrive during the marriage
unexpectedly. The recognition of same-sex marriage would not
further this interest in heterosexual "responsible procreation."
Therefore, the legislative classification of extending marriage
benefits to opposite-sex couples but not same-sex couples is
reasonably related to a clearly identifiable, inherent
characteristic that distinguishes the two classes: the ability or
inability to procreate by "natural" means.2
This very same point was made by the dissent in Goodridge, but
there it went unanswered as a slim majority with hurried and
unexamined assertion chose to severe the linkage between marriage
and procreation. Justice Cordy of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in dissent observed the procreative ill-effects of the
Goodridge path:
Paramount among its many important functions, the institution
of marriage has systematically provided for the regulation of
heterosexual behavior, brought order to the resulting
procreation, and ensured a stable family structure in which
children will be reared, educated, and socialized. Admittedly,
heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child care are not
necessarily conjoined[,] . . but an orderly society requires some
mechanism for coping with the fact that sexual intercourse
commonly results in pregnancy and childbirth. The institution
of marriage is that mechanism .... The institution of marriage
provides the important legal and normative link between
heterosexual intercourse and procreation on the one hand and
family responsibilities on the other. The partners in a marriage
are expected to engage in exclusive sexual relations, with
children the probable result and paternity presumed. Whereas
the relationship between mother and child is demonstratively
and predictably created and recognizable through the biological
process of pregnancy and childbirth, there is no corresponding
process for creating a relationship between father and child.
Similarly, aside from an act of heterosexual intercourse nine
months prior to childbirth, there is no process for creating a
relationship between a man and a woman as the parents of a
particular child. The institution of marriage fills this void by
28. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind. 2005).
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formally binding the husband-father to his wife and child, and
imposing on him the responsibilities of fatherhood. The
alternative, a society without the institution of marriage, in
which heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child care are
largely disconnected processes, would be chaotic.
Marriage Is More Than Sexual Relations
Occasionally hiding behind the benign public face of the same-
sex equality claim is a far more libertine, indeed anti-social, approval
of extra-marital sex. In some respects, those who today advocate
homosexual practice and same-sex marriage are the direct
descendants of the fourth century Manicheans. The Manichees
subscribed to the notion that human beings were sparks of light or
energy that were imprisoned by the created world order. Good in a
Manichean society took the form of defying created human nature,
including procreative intercourse.0 The Manichees in essence taught
that it was salutary to hate one's body. The Manichees not
surprisingly did not have a large impact upon the social order of their
time, or any other, but their self-centeredness was certainly part of
the Roman order, which indulged numerous sexual practices,
including prostitution, homosexual relations, and masturbation.3
In the fourth century, St. Augustine challenged both the
Manichean and Roman perspectives identifying the three essential
elements of marriage to be "procreation, fidelity, and lifelong unity, 32
even as Augustine charitably conceded that the infertile and aged do
capture part of the marital good by "a natural companionship
between the sexes."33 Those who deliberately frustrate the procreative
purpose of marriage, however, were seen as fornicators - a point
plainly made by the twelfth century canon lawyer, Gratian.' All this
came to be summarized by philosopher and theologian, Thomas
Aquinas, who specified marriage's primary purpose as "the
29. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995-96 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
30. JOHN T. NOONAN, CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE
CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS 107-112 (enl. ed., 1986).
31. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 27 (1987).
32. Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The Disappearing
Cornerstone of the American Law of Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 449, 452 (2004).
33. ST. AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, § 3.3 at 6 (P.G. Walsh ed., Oxford
University Press 2001) (401).
34. Gratian's thinking is nicely addressed by Charles Reid, supra note 32.
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procreation of children, but also their upbringing and their training in
the perfect state of man, which is the state of virtue."35
This natural law understanding of marriage was well accepted
and understood contemporaneous with the drafting of the American
Constitution. A leading figure of the New York bar, Chancellor
James Kent described marriage as a natural law concept pre-dating all
government, including that of America. No less a liberal than
William 0. Douglas would say exactly the same a century and a half
later in Griswold v. Connecticut. 36 In his famous Commentaries, Kent
writes:
[T]he primary and most important of the domestic relations, is
that of husband and wife. It has its foundation in nature, and is
the only lawful relation by which Providence has permitted the
continuance of the human race. In every age, it has had a
propitious influence on the moral improvement and happiness
of mankind. It is one of the chief foundations of social order.
We may justly place to the credit of marriage, a great share of
the blessings which flow from the refinement of manners, the
education of children, the sense of justice, and the cultivation of
the liberal arts.37
This natural law understanding of marriage as far more than
sexual relations worked its way into the law of the United States often
without statute. As Kent asked rhetorically, "[aire the principles of
natural law.., to be left unheeded, and inoperative, because we have
no ecclesiastical Courts recognized by law, as specially charged with
the cognizance of such matters?" 38 The answer for Kent, the founding
generation, and each succeeding one to the present, has been "of
course not." The "[p]rohibitions of the natural law are absolute,
uniform, and universal obligation. They become rules of the common
law, which is founded in the common reason and acknowledged duty
of mankind, sanctioned by immemorial usage, and, as such, are
35. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Supplementum, Question 41, article
1, resp.
36. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). "We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights--older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." Id.
37. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 74 (3d ed. 1838).
38. Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343,347 (1820).
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clearly binding." 39 By the middle of the nineteenth century well into
the present day, it was common to find judicial recognition that
marriage is not mere sexual relations - "not the comfort and
convenience of the immediate parties .... [T]he paramount purpose of
the marriage [is] the procreation and protection of legitimate
children, the institution of families, and the creation of natural
relations among mankind; from which proceed all the civilization,
virtue, and happiness to be found in the world."'
By stark contrast, same-sex marriage proponent Professor Maura
Strassberg argues not only for the severance of marriage and
procreation, but also for the separation of marriage and sexual
relationship. Since states have de-criminalized extra-marital
relations, Strassberg argues, "any necessary link between marriage
and sex" can also now be severed. Again, the notion of legitimizing
non-reproductive, extra-marital sexual relations is a rather startling
proposition that would not seem well calculated to advance the cause
of same-sex marriage in the court of public opinion.
Studies reveal that homosexual and heterosexual men have a
similar desire for uncommitted sex." Most women, by contrast, have
the opposite preference, and for this reason, heterosexual men over
their lifetimes have fewer partners, with marriage ideally focusing a
man upon one. By contrast, "[a]mong male homosexual couples, 43
percent have had sex with more than twenty partners," 42 and there is
nothing to suggest that this attitude will change simply by the
expedient of re-labeling the relationship.
The consequences of "mutual expressions of sensuality"'
without procreative unity and commitment are well known apart
from the same-sex marriage claim. The lessons of widespread
children out of wedlock and resulting increases in crime and
decreases in health and education cannot be seen as irrelevant here.
39. KENT, supra note 37, at 347.
40. Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847).
41. RHOADS, supra note 6, at 51.
42. Id.
43. Here, evolutionary studies do find distinction between homosexual men and
women, with lesbians having a desire for fewer sexual partners. Id. While this improves a
lesbian couples standing vis-a-vis adoption in terms of stability alone, it does nothing to
address the state's interest in procreation within a stable family environment, itself.
44. Strassberg, supra note 6, at 1610.
45. See generally, Douglas W. Kmiec, Marriage and Family, in NEVER A MATrER OF
INDIFFERENCE: SUSTAINING VIRTUE IN A FREE REPUBLIC 113 (Peter Berkowitz ed.,
2003).
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While same-sex advocates may argue that without procreative
capacity, gay marriage will at least not worsen the social problem of
illegitimacy, this argument is certainly in tension with their claim that
homosexual and heterosexual marital unions should be seen as
constitutionally equal in their disposition toward children. In any
event, the stability of a relationship built largely upon mutual
sensual pleasure cannot realistically be seen as having great stability,
and the wrenching consequences of single-parenting after dissolution
will be as bad, if not worse, since a homosexual partner with no
biological or genetic relationship with a child is more likely than not
to be disinterested in providing for, or overseeing, a child's well-
being.
The Natural Law Understanding Of Marriage As Linked With
Procreation Figures Prominently In The Supreme Court's
Treatment Of Marriage As A Fundamental Right
For well over a century, the Supreme Court has held that
marriage "is the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress. 46 In Skinner
v. Oklahoma, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a criminal penalty
permitting the sterilization of habitual criminals. In reaching that
holding after considering both equal protection and due process
arguments, the Justices opined that "[miarriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." This
proposition has been repeated by the Court as it found the
government to lack a compelling governmental interest to sustain
state regulation that conditioned marriage on being up-to-date on
child support payments from a previous marriage in Zablocki v.
Redhail. 49 The procreative basis of marriage has likewise been
consistently referenced by lower federal and state courts. For
example, a federal court has stated that the "legal protection and
special status afforded to marriage.., has historically.., been
rationalized as being for the purpose of encouraging the propagation
of the race."5° The District of Columbia, Minnesota, and Washington
have all recognized that marriage uniquely involves the possibility of
46. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
47. 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942).
48. Id. at 541.
49. 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978).
50. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1036
(9th Cir. 1982).
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the natural procreation of children."
Notwithstanding the above, it is widely speculated that the U.S.
Supreme Court may soon be inclined to accept arguments in favor of
same-sex marriage. Judge Robert Bork writes that "[w]ithin the next
two or three years, the Supreme Court will almost certainly climax a
series of state court rulings by creating a national constitutional right
to homosexual marriage. 5 2 To get to that destination, the Court will
have to disavow the link between procreation and marriage as the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did in the invention of a right
to same-sex marriage under its state charter. Again the
Massachusetts Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
simply asserted that "the begetting of children.., is [not] the sine qua
non of civil marriage.
53
As a formal matter, Judge Bork's prediction seems outweighed
by the natural law origin of marriage, stare decisis, and even the U.S.
Supreme Court's one-time summary dismissal of an appeal of the
Minnesota decision in Baker v. Nelson-' that sustained limiting
marriage to a man and a woman against an entire battery of
constitutional claims more than thirty years ago. In truth, little more
than a single case, Turner v. Safley,55 invalidating Missouri regulations
precluding marriage by prison inmates accounts for the legal
groundwork for a definition of marriage that does not include
procreation.
Prison inmates do not lose all constitutional protections while
incarcerated, and the Court has balanced access to marriage against
the reasonable needs of prison administration. In doing so, Turner
matter of factly describes marriage in terms of emotional support and
public commitment, religious significance, the receipt of various
governmental benefits like social security and property distribution
rights, but only the possibility (depending logically upon the
sentence) of later consummation (and procreation). Turner is thus
claimed to severe marriage and the possibility of procreation by not
including consummation - and the possibility of procreation - in the
51. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 332 (D.C. 1995); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974),
all recognizing that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by
their union.
52. Bork, supra note 21.
53. 798 N.E.2d 941,961 (Mass. 2003).
54. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
55. 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).
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Supreme Court's marital description.
This over-reads Turner in the extreme. First off, the Court had
earlier summarily affirmed a ban on marriages for inmates with life
sentences. 6 And even if this earlier ban merely was premised upon
penological considerations in light of severity of sentence, the same
can be said of Turner as well but in the opposite direction. As a
matter of state-generosity or penological consideration, the Court
urged prison officials to see even non-procreative marriage in a prison
setting as a means of encouraging prisoner reformation. So too, the
Court reasoned, prison officials might authorize more generous
access to marriage to minimize religious conflict, which has been a
frequent source of difficulty in prison administration. It is mistaken
to see Turner's highly limited discussion of marital meaning in a
prison context as endorsing some "evolving social sense that sexual
relations of any kind are not essential to marriage."57
Fatuous or not, it did not take very long before some judges
started to construe Turner out of context. In Dean v. District of
Columbia,"8 the local District of Columbia appellate court turned
away a claim for same-sex marriage, pointing the litigants to the
legislature, but one judge gratuitously took the occasion in partial
dissent to explain how Turner opened the door to homosexual
marriage. Judge John Ferren wrote:
[I]f the qualities of marriage described in Turner are "relevant
to the needs and aspirations of gays and lesbians ... we have
the basis for inquiring whether a marriage statute that excludes
homosexuals from the right to marry one another meets equal
protection requirements. Appellants proffer that, given the
nature of homosexuality, Turner's attributes of marriage -
emotional support, religious or spiritual significance, physical
consummation, and government and other benefits - are as
relevant and important to same-sex couples as to heterosexual
couples. I perceive no basis for doubting that appellants can
make such a showing."'59
56. Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974), summarily affirming Johnson v. Rockefeller,
365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). As the Court, itself, explained in Turner, "That case
involved a prohibition on marriage only for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment; and,
importantly, denial of the right was part of the punishment for crime." Turner, 482 U.S. at
96.
57. Strassberg, supra note 6, at 1559.
58. 653 A. 2d 307 (D.C. Ct. Of App. 1995).
59. Id. at 336 (Ferren, J., dissenting in part).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has not endorsed this reasoning, even
in the much criticized ° Lawrence v. Texas, where the Court found a
due process liberty right for two individuals of the same sex to engage
in consensual sodomy. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy opines that
"personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing and education" are protected by
the Constitution, and then went on to casually remark later that a gay
person "may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual
persons do., 61 It is not clear if Justice Kennedy and the plurality
meant this to be an implied endorsement of same-sex marriage, since
the Court also pointed out that the facts in Lawrence did "not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."'62 Had the Court
truly meant to say that there was a homosexual marriage right,
something which Justice O'Connor in a separate opinion based on
equal protection analysis expressly denies, the Court presumably
would have been far more explicit as well as applied a higher standard
of review to the evaluation of state authority.
But there is doubt. As Justice Scalia observed in his Lawrence
dissent, the Court has gone a long way toward "dismantl[ing] the
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be
made between heterosexual and homosexual unions., 63  For a
committed federalist observant of original understanding and state
sovereignty, Judge Bork, like President Bush, urges a strikingly
federal assertion of power. Bork explains the departure from his
usual presumptions this way:
The comfortable shibboleths about a heavy presumption
against amending the Constitution no longer have much
relevance to the brute facts of our political life. So profound is
the departure from a republican form of government that the
presumption must now be in favor of amending the
Constitution whenever the Court runs wild. Homosexual
marriage presents just such an occasion, but if our politicians
wait until the Supreme Court has done the inevitable, it will
probably be too late for an effective response. Catastrophes
60. See the highly incisive comments of John 0. McGinnis and Nelson Lund,
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (2004).
61. Id. at 574.
62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
63. Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ought not be faced in a spirit of resignation.64
Judge Bork's prescription in favor of a Federal Marriage
Amendment is strong medicine. It is one that he seeks to anchor in
common sense and compassion. Given the "physical and
psychological disorders ...far more prevalent among homosexual
men," Judge Bork reasons, "[c]ompassion, if nothing else, should
urge us to avoid the consequences of making homosexuality seem a
normal and acceptable choice for the young."'65 The advocates of
same-sex marriage seek to transform the toleration and privacy
accepted in Lawrence into a public affirmation. Explaining why the
terminology and related benefits of "civil union" are not enough to
satisfy the gay/lesbian demands, gay marriage advocate Evan Wolfson
quotes with approval the following observation: "civil union connotes
toleration of homosexuality, with its attendant recognition of an
individual's civil rights; but marriage connotes society's full approval
of homosexuality, with previous moral judgments reversed." 66
A redefinition of the public institution of marriage would be very
much an overt and public act. It is decidedly unlike the private sexual
intimacy of concern in Bowers v. Hardwick67 or Lawrence, and as
suggested here, threatens the procreative good of the larger
community. It is hardly an expression of animus to state objection to
a redefinition with a public harm. Rather, maintaining the definition
of marriage is respectful of an institution that is not created by the
state and indeed is "older than the Bill of Rights - older than our
political parties, older than our school system. 61
The False Analogy Between The Civil Rights Movement And
The Effort To Redefine Marriage
The advocates of same-sex marriage often liken themselves to
the champions of racial equality. This analogy is nominally plausible
since one of the most famous race cases, Loving v. Virginia,69 took
place in the marriage setting. Loving held that denying marriage to
an interracial couple was contrary to the guarantee of equal
protection.
64. Bork, supra note 25, at 21.
65. Id. at 19-20.
66. WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 134 (quoting William Safire).
67. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
69. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Is the analogy between ending race-based discrimination with
respect to marriage and the effort to redefine marriage by same-sex
marriage advocates a fair one? As a formal precedential matter, it
has already been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.70 Likewise,
some prominent African-American leaders also think the analogy
inapt. For example, Pastor Steven Craft of New Brunswick states
adamantly:
[A]s an African-American, I find it highly offensive to associate
homosexuality with civil rights. People have been trying to run
on that civil rights banner and to use this whole idea of
homosexual marriage to say it's the next wave of the movement.
But race and sexuality have nothing to do with each other."71
Same-sex proponent Wolfson notes this comment but argues that
Reverend Craft and others are merely being used by the right-wing,
although even he later admits there is no simple comparison.72 What
makes the comparison difficult is the perplexing nature of sexual
orientation. To the extent sexual orientation is not a choice, but a
genetically-determined status or identity, law and justice
appropriately resists using that criterion for purposes of drawing legal
classification. After all, the injustice of differentiating under law on
70. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). As the Indiana Court of Appeals recited in
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 19-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005):
In Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a ban on same-sex marriages did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. In so holding, the court rejected the same-sex couple plaintiffs'
principal argument that Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), required that they
be issued a marriage license. The court stated that Loving, which held bans on
interracial marriages violated the Fourteenth Amendment, was decided solely on
the grounds of the patent racial discrimination of such statutes. Baker, 191
N.W.2d at 187. It also stated, "in commonsense and in a constitutional sense,
there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race
and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex." Id. The couple
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal
without opinion "for want of a substantial federal question." Baker v. Nelson,
409 U.S. 810 (1972). Under procedural rules in effect at the time, the Plaintiffs
do not contest that, unlike a denial of certiorari, such a dismissal represented a
decision by the Supreme Court on the merits that the constitutional challenge
presented was insubstantial, and which decision is binding on lower courts. See
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344. Thus, the Supreme Court, five years after it
decided Loving, determined that that case did not support an argument by same-
sex couples that precluding them from marrying violated the Fourteenth
Amendment" (citations omitted).
71. WOLFSON, supra note 6, at 165 (quoting Rev. Craft).
72. Id. at 171 (quoting Prof. Henry Gates Jr., an African-American historian).
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the basis of race was that skin color told us nothing about the moral
and personal qualities of an individual and was not in any way a
"choice."
Such categorical statement is not possible with homosexual
orientation, which is said by religious leaders to be "disordered., 73 If
sexual orientation proves ultimately to be wholly genetic, a matter
which is far from settled, the analogy to race is closer. Even gay
marriage advocate Wolfson himself admits the possibility of change
of orientation. Independently, whether sexual orientation is or is
not a matter of choice does not really answer the state's legal interest
in preserving the link between marriage and procreation. Affirming a
marital union between two individuals of homosexual orientation
would ignore the vital state interest in the level and responsibility of
procreation. The fact of a homosexual orientation, whatever its
moral significance origin, unlike the fact of race, does tell us
something about the capability and disposition of the person in the
marital context.
How ever much the Court's decision in Lawrence may come to
mean, it certainly is a caution against casual reliance upon majority-
determined moral perspective as a singular basis for restricting
individual claims of liberty. For this reason, it has been the working
thesis of this article that a state interest in procreation can support
traditional marriage without need to recur or to assess the
importantly related moral claims. Moreover, apart from precedential
limits on the people's reliance upon moral source for legislative
enactment, the exercise of moral judgment should be admitted to be
the most difficult aspect of the marriage question. Giving personal
advice of any kind should be premised upon an ethic of care or love,
not animus, and this should be especially true when the subject is
marriage. For this reason, it is important to be on guard against over-
extending into the law argumentation that depends upon sexual
orientation alone. Differentiating upon sexual orientation alone in
73. "Although the particular inclination of the homosexual person is not a sin, it is a
more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil; and thus the
inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder. "Therefore special concern and
pastoral attention should be directed toward those who have this condition lest they be led
to believe that the living out of this orientation in homosexual activity is a morally
acceptable option. It is not" (No. 3), citing the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
under the direction of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, now His Holiness Benedict XVI. The
full letter can be found at
http://catholicinsight.com/online/church/vatican/article_462.shtml.
74. Id. at 174.
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the general workplace ought not be tolerated, as hopefully, sexual
practice (or harassment) is out of bounds there. By comparison,
orientation that gives rise to practice arguably does matter in the
close quarters of the military, which is why the military's "don't
ask/don't tell" policy is closer to a just outcome than either outright
denial of the opportunity for military service or indiscriminate
inclusion. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
left open the issue of whether the Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence necessitates a change in the "don't ask/don't tell" policy,
but found the policy unquestionably valid where a higher ranked
officer engaged in homosexual acts with someone under his
command.75
A Final Word
The federal government has once before ruled a marital relation
out of bounds in its prohibition of polygamy in Reynolds v. United
States.7 6 Today, the Mormon faith - without polygamy - is seen as
producing highly responsible, committed families and reliable
citizens. "Non-Mormons became more tolerant of Mormon religious
beliefs as soon as Mormons... conformed to more traditional
75. In U.S. v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198 (2004) the CAAF left open the issue of whether
Lawrence applies to the military in the same manner as it applies to the general
population. The final decision in Marcum favored the Pentagon's prosecution of Air
Force Technical Sgt. Eric P. Marcum for sodomy under Article 125 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. That outcome, however, depended entirely on the CAAF's factual
conclusion that the sergeant had engaged in sodomy with one of his subordinates, in
circumstances suggesting that the junior serviceman may well have felt coerced into the
sexual encounter. Lawrence, of course, did not undertake to protect a right to sexual
privacy when coercion was involved. Thus, the ruling against Marcum was keyed to the
difference in rank between the two sexual partners, in violation of explicit military
regulations reinforced by criminal punishment-regulations designed to assure that
superiors do not absorb their rank. Article 125, therefore, is constitutional when used in
that factual circumstance, the CAAF concluded. Chief Judge Susan J. Crawford wrote
separately indicating that the majority should not have made any assumption that
Lawrence applied at all. Military lawyers had argued that Lawrence simply did not apply
"in the military environment due to the distinct and separate character of military life
from civilian life as recognized by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Levy (1974)" and had
contended that "Lawrence only applies to civilian conduct." There appears to be some
weakening of this position, however. The military landscape, Judge Baker wrote in the
majority, is less certain than the government suggests. The fog of constitutional law settles
on separate and shared powers where neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
spoken authoritatively. Congress has indeed exercised its Article I authority to address
homosexual sodomy in the Armed Forces, but this occurred prior to the Supreme Court's
constitutional decision and analysis in Lawrence.
76. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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conduct., 77 Polygamy, itself, however, was declared by the Court to
be "subversive of good order," and that precedent is undisturbed. It
is difficult to discern how same-sex marriage would be consistent with
the holding in Reynolds. Nevertheless, critics of the Reynolds opinion
argue that the case was wrongly decided "because the Court overrode
core personal rights of privacy and religious expression for the sake of
diffuse social goals. No victims of Reynolds' conduct were produced
,,78
What then of same-sex marriage? Would same-sex marriage be
subversive of good order? Would there be victims of this public
affirmation of homosexual practice? The strongest aspect of the
Mormon polygamy claim was its argued religious origin. It was a plea
for a religious experience outside the bounds of community. Whether
the American conception of religious freedom is robust enough, then
or now, to permit religiously-grounded polygamy can be debated.
But the proponents of same-sex marriage have little in common with
the Mormon elders who searched for Zion in the Utah territory of the
19th century. That comparison is as ill-fitting as the claimed analogy
to civil rights. Same-sex marriage advocates do not seek a community
apart, but the remaking of the larger community in ways that
contradict the procreative truth of the human person.
As it is proposed to be remade, the redefining of marriage is
subversive of the state objective in sustaining the national population
by responsible procreation. While this singular objective may lack
the multi-faceted eloquence of spiritual affirmations of traditional
marriage,79 or more expansive moral discourse, it is more than
77. EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE
COURTS 374 (1988).
78. Id.
79. The Vatican's statement in opposition to same-sex marriage, for example, largely
resonates with those who possess a spiritual faith that understands marriage as the
completion of two sides 0 male and female 0Oof the Divine creation. We can scarcely
understand God, but an appreciation of the unity of both genders gives us a clue. The
Vatican writes:
The Church's teaching on marriage and on the complementarity of the sexes
reiterates a truth that is evident to right reason and recognized as such by all the
major cultures of the world. Marriage is not just any relationship between human
beings. It was established by the Creator with its own nature, essential properties
and purpose. No ideology can erase from the human spirit the certainty that
marriage exists solely between a man and a woman, who by mutual personal gift,
proper and exclusive to themselves, tend toward the communion of their
persons. In this way, they mutually perfect each other, in order to cooperate with
God in the procreation and upbringing of new human lives.
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc-con-cfaith-do
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sufficient - indeed compelling - for the people to proscribe same-sex
unions.
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